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their home in a Texas trailer park. By now Noble had become an anti-cult activist, but he had not lost his religious zeal. 'Although I had been studying and working on terrorism for many years by that time, ' Stern reports, ' none of what I had read or heard prepared me for that conversation, which was about faith at least as much as it was about violence' (Stern, 2003: xiv) .
Stern's interview with Noble started five years of travels across the world. She sought out and talked to Christian, Muslim, and Jewish militants who had committed themselves not merely to hate but to kill their enemies. Her subjects qualify as terrorists because they engage in terrorism, as she defines it: 'an act or threat of violence against noncombatants with the objective of exacting revenge, intimidating, or otherwise influencing an audience' (Stern, 2003: xx) . They qualify as religious terrorists because they threaten or inflict violence, as Stern's book title puts it, in the name of God. They wage holy war.
Precisely because Stern combines strongly stated arguments with firsthand observation, her dramatic book provides a wonderful opportunity to think through what it means to explain terror. How do concepts, evidence, and explanations intersect, in her account and in competing accounts of terror? This article summarizes Stern's explanations, compares them with those of the US State Department, and identifies weaknesses in both. Although I will sketch a way of thinking about terror that differs from Stern's and State's, the point of this article is not to sell my own explanations. It is to help us think together about more or less valid strategies of explanation.
Any valid approach begins with well-stated questions. Stern clearly identifies the two main questions she is asking: first, what grievances lead people to join and stick with holy war organizations? Second, how do leaders run effective terrorist organizations? On her way to answers, she reports a fascinating pilgrimage through dangerous places.
What grievances? Stern sees Jewish, Christian, and Muslim holy warriors as humiliated people who have learned to blame specific others for their suffering. They seek to simplify and purify their own lives by participating in heroic acts that will simplify and purify the whole world. The humiliation may occur at an individual level, or it can result from stigma attached to a whole category of people -for instance, all Muslims or all Jews. Since the world continues to reject the objects of humiliation and to persist in its corruption, the division between 'us' and 'them' becomes sharper and sharper. The division itself generates rage and a readiness to use any means, including lethal violence, against the enemy.
Kerry Noble, Stern reports, suffered from chronic bronchitis as a child. It so weakened him that in first grade he attended the girls' physical education class instead of exercising with the boys. Other boys bullied him. He wanted to be valedictorian of his high school class, but his family's frequent moves made him ineligible. The military turned him down because of his childhood illnesses. While he was working in an 'awful job' after high school, one night he had a vision in which God gave him the gift of teaching and pastoring. That vision started him on the long road to the CSA, along which he accepted the cult's division of the world into the few who would emerge sainted from Armageddon and the ungodly remainder condemned to awful, rapid death (Stern, 2003: 22-4) .
What sorts of terrorist organizations survive and prosper, as Stern sees it? Stern singles out organizations whose leaders provide combinations of spiritual, emotional, and material rewards meeting the needs of people who are already seeking to participate in simplifying and purifying the world. Although charisma helps, steady provision of spiritual, emotional, and material benefits helps even more.
If you accept Stern's explanation of religiously framed terrorist violence, what competing explanations should you reject? We might call them the coercion, brainwashing, ideology, and variety theses. Militant groups sometimes capture and coerce new members, who initially comply out of fear, however much they may later adapt to membership. Critics of cults have often accused them of brainwashing vulnerable people, turning them into obedient servants of alien causes. We hear a great deal about religious extremism as a product of seductive, perverted ideology, with committed killers acting out the implications of mistaken beliefs. Finally, a few plaintive voices, including mine, insist on the variety of people and organizations that actually engage in terrorism. Rejecting coercion, brainwashing, ideology, and variety accounts, Stern describes a single path to religious terrorism. The path leads from personal or cultural humiliation to us-them thinking to membership in groups that support lives organized around fundamental distinctions between good and bad, pure and impure, us and them.
Later I will state my reservations about Stern's arguments and will also point out concessions Stern herself makes to the competition. For now, let us simply note that Stern's arguments differ significantly from explanations in other analyses of terror (e.g. Caddick-Adams and Holmes, 2001; Crenshaw, 1983 Crenshaw, , 1995 della Porta and Pasquino, 1983; Farah, 2004; Futrell and Brents, 2003; González Callejo, 2002a Kalyvas, 1999; Kushner, 2001; Mason and Krane, 1989; Mommsen and Hirschfeld, 1982; Oliverio, 1998; Rapoport, 1999; Ruby, 2002; Schmid, 2001; Schmid and de Graaf, 1982; Senechal de la Roche, 2004; Smelser and Mitchell, 2002a, 2002b; Tilly, 2002a; Turk, 2004; Waldmann, 1993; Walter, 1969) . Other analyses give more credence to the coercion, brainwashing, ideology, or variety theses, as well as usually emphasizing political processes more strongly.
Greatly broadening its scope from religious fanaticism, for example, the US State Department defines terror as 'premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience ' (State, 2004a: xii) . Box 1 states the crucial specifications. The State definition of terror differs from Stern's mainly by requiring political motivation and by excluding threats in favor of actual violence. But it takes in a much wider range of actions than the explicitly religious intimidation and vengeance on which Stern concentrates. In general, it rests on a more political view of terrorism than Stern's; seen up close, State's terrorists may be fanatics, but they are struggling for political power, sometimes work for foreign powers, and often ally themselves with other political actors, foreign or domestic.
State's own catalogs of terrorism say as much. The term terrorism means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.
The term international terrorism means terrorism involving citizens of the territory of more than one country.
The term terrorist group means any group practicing or with significant subgroups that practice international terrorism. The United States Government has employed this definition of terrorism for statistical and analytical purposes since 1983. 
* State Department reporters
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Afghanistan: In Nangarhar, two security officers escorting several United Nations vehicles were killed when armed terrorists attacked their convoy, according to press reports. No one claimed responsibility.
1/31
India: In Srinigar, Kashmir, armed terrorists killed a local journalist when they entered his office, according to press reports. No one claimed responsibility.
Where do the data come from? By congressional mandate, since the 1980s State has issued an annual report on global terrorism. Until 2003, State officials collected annual summaries from embassies across the world, compiling them into a global catalog with simple statistics. After 9/11 and shortly before the American-led invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration changed the reporting procedure. It created the (ominously named) Terrorist Threat Integration Center. The new center took over responsibility for preparation of the annual catalog, which in turn compiled reports from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense. Descriptive details, nevertheless, seem to have come largely from press reports.
The new coordination did not work well. Asked if the new statistics meant that the United States was not 'prevailing,' Mr Powell said that he had to leave for a meeting at the White House but that two specialists would explain. 'Here are the experts,' he said. 'They will tell you' (Weisman, 2004: A12) .
Experts J. Cofer Black, coordinator for counterterrorism, and John O. Brennan, director of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, blamed an obsolete database and a defective computer program for the previous undercount. We should understand, then, that the State Department's terror statistics won't stand up to close social scientific scrutiny (Krueger, 2004; Krugman, 2004) . But they do illustrate a distinctive way of thinking about terror, a way that differs from Jessica Stern's main line of argument.
With the new numbers in place, Figure If the Bush administration contributed to the decline of terror after 2001, then, according to its own figures, it was furthering a downward trend that started a decade earlier.
Note, in any case, what these counts exclude, even if they get the trend right. The word 'terror' took on a political meaning with the French Revolution's virtue-imposing dictatorship of 1793 (Gérard, 1999; Greer, 1935; Guenniffey, 2000; Mayer, 2000) . From that point on, analysts often applied it to governments that enforced compliance by threat and deed. In the recent past, Stalin, Hitler, Pol Pot, and Saddam Hussein have all figured as men who ruled by terror, with the implication that except for fear their people would have rejected them. The State Department's definition of terror, however, excludes the threat or use of force by governments (Oliverio, 1998; Stanley, 1996; 1985). It also downplays the frequent employment of threat and coercion by armies and militias against civilian populations during civil wars (Berkeley, 2001; Chesterman, 2001; Davenport, 2000; Ellis, 2000; Tishkov, 1997 Tishkov, , 2004 .
Whether backed by governments or not, genocide and ethnic cleansing likewise do not appear in the State Department counts (Bax, 2000; Brubaker and Laitin, 1998; Harff, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2004; Kakar, 1996; Levin and Rabrenovic, 2001; Mamdani, 2001; Mazower, 2002; Naimark, 2001; Prunier, 1995 Prunier, , 2001 Taylor, 1999; Toft, 2003; Uvin, 2001 ). Although we might quibble over that unexploded bomb in a Pakistani toilet, State Department listings generally omit threats to do harm unless someone had put lethal weapons in place, ready for use. Official US government inventories of terrorism draw a rough circle around episodes in which politically identified actors other than governments or armies apply violent means to noncombatants, with special attention to episodes in which perpetrators and victims identify with different national governments.
So what? No one owns the definitions of terror, terrorism, or terrorists (Tilly, 2004b) . Any working definition of terror excludes some candidate actions and events. Politically speaking, it usually helps your cause to use the term 'terror' for actions of which you disapprove, and to exempt actions of which you approve. Definitions begin to matter, however, when you shift from description or evaluation to explanation. At exactly that point two implicit claims come into play. First, in explanations a concept such as terror lays a claim to identify a causally coherent phenomenon rather than a convenient miscellany. Second, the same concept points to similarities and differences: instance X resembles instance Y, but differs in kind from instance Z.
Jessica Stern, for example, makes both claims: that religiously motivated terrorism has common properties that make it eligible for a single line of explanation, and that it differs deeply from other applications of violence with which careless analysts might easily confuse it. Responding to a legislative requirement that it file an annual report on international terrorist attacks, the State Department makes no such strong claims for explanation. Yet its own annual reports assume a shadowy world in which power-seeking nonstate actors strike out at noncombatant citizens, organizations, and corporations of legitimate regimes, especially the US regime.
Both Stern and State, furthermore, point their readers to a distinctive form of explanation, a dispositional explanation. Crudely speaking, general descriptions and explanations of social processes divide into three categories: systemic, relational, and dispositional. Systemic accounts posit a coherent, selfsustaining entity such as a society, a world economy, a community, an organization, a household, or, at the limit, a person, explaining events inside that entity by their location within the entity as a whole. Some systemic accounts of terror, for example, treat it as a worldwide effect of globalization and rapid social change that disrupt previously existing constraints on extremism. Systemic descriptions and explanations have the advantage of taking seriously a knotty problem for social scientists: how to connect small-scale and large-scale social processes. They have two vexing disadvantages: the enormous difficulty of identifying and bounding relevant systems, and persistent confusion about cause and effect within such systems.
Relational accounts take interactions among social sites as their starting points, treating both events at those sites and durable characteristics of those sites as outcomes of interactions. Relational accounts of terrorism stress changes in connections among persons and groups, for example altered ties among exiles, international criminal networks, and domestic power-seekers. Relational descriptions and explanations have the advantage of placing communication, including the use of language, at the heart of social life. They have the disadvantage of contradicting common sense accounts of social behavior, and thus of articulating poorly with conventional moral reasoning in which entities take responsibility for dispositions and their consequences.
Like systemic descriptions and explanations, dispositional accounts posit coherent entities -in this case more often individuals than any othersbut explain the actions of those entities by means of their orientations just before the point of action. Across the social sciences, dispositional accounts come in several competing varieties. They sometimes feature:
• motives, from individual to collective; they include Stern's 'grievances'; • emotions, again from individual to collective; • decision logics, often in the form of matches among incentives, preferences, and opportunities; and • cultural templates, including ideologies.
But in all these varieties, they fix on orientations of actors that precede and presumably cause action. Stern's account of recruitment and commitment to street-level terrorist activity emphasizes humiliation and alienation as shapers of individual or collective dispositions. When cast at the level of the individual organism, dispositional descriptions and explanations have the advantage of articulating easily with the findings of neuroscience, genetics, and evolutionary analysis. They have the great disadvantage of accounting badly for the emergence of new properties in relations among entities, much less for the effects of aggregate properties such as population density and network structure. Dispositional descriptions and explanations have another remarkable property that increases their attractiveness to a wide range of users: they resemble the stories in which people generally package their everyday accounts of human events and social processes (Tilly, 2002b (Tilly, , 2004a . Stories place limited numbers of motivated actors within well-bounded times and spaces, accounting for everything that happens as consequences of those actors' behaviors. By attributing responsibility to concrete actors, they make it easy to distribute praise and blame. We have watched Jessica Stern tell the story of Kerry Noble, which clearly calls up praise and blame -mostly blame -for his participation in the CSA.
Stories simplify causation drastically by eliminating simultaneous and reciprocal causation, feedback, incremental effects, indirect effects, environmental influences, mistakes, and most unanticipated consequences. They do a wonderful job of making events and social processes memorable and comprehensible, but at the cost of ignoring the sorts of complex causation that appear regularly in biological, physical, economic, or sociological explanations of the same events and social processes. Everyday discussions of terror tell stories: terrorists -certain kinds of persons -felt desires to inflict harm on certain sorts of victims, and did so. Stern's story of Kerry Noble starts with his childhood and troubled youth, which supplied him with the disposition to participate in religious terrorism.
Trouble starts exactly there. Trouble Number 1 homogenizes terrorists, saying that all share the same dispositions. Terrorists could, of course, actually be homogeneous in the same sense that everyone who catches measles catches it in pretty much the same way, through ingestion of a paramyxovirus. In fact, Stern buys into that image when she says, 'I have come to see terrorism as a kind of virus, which spreads as a result of risk factors at various levels: global, interstate, national, and personal' (Stern, 2003: 283) . Beware of virus analogies when it comes to human affairs! Viruses exist; we can see them under a microscope. They enter cells, reproduce, alter cell structures, and cause visible damage. To use the virus analogy for a social process, one must make sure one pins down the agent, the mechanism, and the consequences and make sure the agent produces its effects in essentially the same way every time.
Trouble Number 2 treats dispositions as sufficient causes: once we know what terrorists want, we can explain their actions. Stern gestures in that direction as she describes her search for empathy with religious extremists who kill: 'It is possible to understand and vicariously share the feelings that give rise to terrorism -if only briefly -and still maintain that the terrorist's actions are immoral, or even evil' (Stern, 2003: xvii) . Then she pulls back. The book builds in relational explanations galore: recruitment processes, organizational processes, processes that affect the opportunity to kill, and more. Still, like most users of dispositional explanations in the social sciences, she treats these relational processes not as direct causes but as factors that promote or inhibit the central cause of terrorism: formation of a consciousness dividing the world starkly into us and them, seeing us as pure but threatened, seeing them as impure and threatening.
Dispositional explanations of terror confront relational explanations at many points. Take the example of public uproar over the treatment of Muslim captives in Iraq: the first phase of the discussion asked how such bad apples as the low-ranking soldiers who tortured and humiliated their Iraqi captives could have acquired such rotten dispositions, especially how female soldiers could possibly have become so perverse. But the farther the discussion goes, the more relational processes involving the whole military and civilian hierarchy become central to the explanation. 'Given the known facts,' complains veteran reporter Anthony Lewis, 'the notion that the photographed outrages at Abu Ghraib were just the actions of a few sick men and women, as President Bush has repeatedly argued, is beyond belief' (Lewis, 2004: 8) . I am agreeing with Lewis but complaining about the line of explanation as well. In the world of terror at large, dispositional explanations do not take us far. If we do not go relational, we will not explain terror.
Let me state my counterclaims as clearly as I can. Here they are:
1.
Terror is not the outflow of a uniform mentality but a strategy employed by a wide array of actors whose motives, means, and organization vary greatly.
2.
Political actors who commit their whole lives to terror perform only a small share of all terroristic acts; the overwhelming majority of terrorists also engage in other sorts of politics, or non-politics, simultaneously, earlier, and/or later. 3.
If we are trying to explain when, where, and how people actually engage in terror, relational explanations will serve us far better than systemic or dispositional explanations.
All this amounts to saying that terror is a strategy, that the strategy involves interactions among political actors, and that to explain the adoption of such a strategy we have no choice but to analyze it as part of a political process.
Here is another way of illustrating the same claims. Look back at the nine significant terrorist incidents the US State Department reported for January 2003. Leave aside doubts about the exclusion of armies and governments, as well as about the selectiveness with which the CIA, FBI, Homeland Security Department, and Defense Department gathered their reports of such incidents. Suppose you acquire a specialist's knowledge of each and every episode. Find out who performed the violence, even where the State report doesn't tell you. Interrogate the perpetrators. Read their minds. You will not, I predict, find that the agents of terror the State Department locates in India, Pakistan, Israel, Kuwait, Colombia, and Afghanistan shared the same motives and outlooks, however broadly you define those motives and outlooks.
Suppose further that you persist in asking why these people, times, and places, rather than others, why these victims, why these means of inflicting damage. You will then, I forecast, find yourself writing a sort of questionnaire with headings something like these:
1.
What processes brought these particular people to the sites of violence? 2.
How did the means of violence reach the perpetrators' hands?
3.
What produced the boundaries and relations between perpetrators and victims? 4.
What kinds of social settings and circumstances promote or inhibit these processes of recruitment, supply, and boundary formation? 5.
To what extent and how did the violent encounters result from coordination by leaders, planners, and organizations?
As you answer these pressing questions, you will be moving onto relational ground (Tilly, 2003: chapter 1) . Even if you cling to dispositional explanations, you will increasingly place them within relational contexts. You will find available stories -even those told by so-called terrorists and terrorism experts -increasingly inadequate. You will, in short, join me in my dissatisfaction with dispositions as sufficient causes of anything so complex as terrorism.
A relational perspective helps bring some order into the analysis of terror. Here are four relational steps:
Notice that a recurrent strategy of intimidation -a relation, not a propensity -occurs widely in contentious politics, and corresponds approximately to what many people mean by terror: asymmetrical deployment of threats and violence against enemies. 2.
Recognize that a wide variety of individuals, groups, and networks sometimes employ that strategy. 3.
Connect the strategy systematically to other forms of political struggle proceeding in the same settings and populations. 4.
Observe that specialists in coercion ranging from government employees to bandits sometimes deploy terror under certain political circumstances, usually with far more devastating effects than the terror operations of nonspecialists.
The horrors of 9/11 should not blind us to systematic variation in the character and origins of terror.
Terror as a Strategy Asymmetrical deployment of threats and violence against enemies does have a crude logic of its own. It differs from such competing strategies as accommodation, negotiation, subversion, infiltration, propaganda, and open warfare. In addition to whatever harm it inflicts directly, it sends signalssignals that the target is vulnerable, that the perpetrators exist, that the perpetrators have the capacity to strike again. The signals typically reach three different audiences: the targets themselves, potential allies of the perpetrators, and third parties that might cooperate with one or the other. Although some users of terror (for example, a minority of 19th-century anarchists) operate on the theory that destruction of evil objects is a good in itself, most terror supports demands for recognition, redress, autonomy, or transfers of power. Considered as a strategy, terror works best when it alters or inhibits the target's disapproved behavior, fortifies the perpetrators' standing with potential allies, and moves third parties toward greater cooperation with the perpetrators' organization and announced program.
Multiple Uses of Terror
From 'Mafiosi' to ruthless governments, people who operate protection rackets intermittently deploy terror against enemies and uncertain clients (Gambetta, 1993; Stanley, 1996; Varese, 2001; Volkov, 2000 Volkov, , 2002 . Whether or not they operate large-scale protection rackets, repressive governments frequently apply terror to threatening minorities. Weak, beleaguered governments commonly adopt the strategy of exemplary punishment: inflicting terrible public retaliation on those few enemies they manage to seize, with the announced threat of visiting similar punishments on others who dare to challenge them. But dissidents seeking autonomy, striking at their rivals, or trying to bring down governments likewise sometimes engage in asymmetrical deployment of threats and violence against enemies by means that fall outside the forms of political struggle routinely operating within the current regime.
During the past few decades, religious and ethnic activists have been by far the most frequent nongovernmental strategists of terror (see e.g. Beissinger, 2001; Derluguian, 1999; Gurr, 2000; Horowitz, 2001; Kakar, 1996) . Sometimes they have demanded autonomy, sometimes they have sought control of existing governments, but often enough they have struck directly at their religious and ethnic rivals. The terrible Rwandan genocide of 1994 pivoted ultimately on ethnic control of the Rwandan state, and, despite the slaughter of Tutsis by the hundreds of thousands, ended with the seizure of state power by Tutsi-dominated military forces. The genocide itself activated all these different uses of terror (Des Forges et al., 1999; Mamdani, 2001; Pillay, 2001; Prunier, 1995 Prunier, , 2001 Taylor, 1999; Uvin, 2001) .
Terror and Other Forms of Struggle As these varied examples suggest, the strategy of terror appears across a wide variety of political circumstances, in the company of very different sorts of political struggle. Attacks of Irish Protestant and Catholic activists on each other and on governmental targets, for instance, frequently follow the strategy of terror, but they generally intersect with other forms of negotiation at international, national, and local levels (Farrell, 2000; Hart, 1998; Jarman, 1997; Keogh, 2001) . In many parts of the world, specialized military forces -governmental, nongovernmental, and antigovernmentalfrequently engage in kidnapping, murder, and mutilation in addition to their occasional pitched battles with other armed forces.
Because armed forces depend on arms, equipment, food, and pay even when they are living off the land, such terror-wielding armies thrive especially where they can seize control of income-generating resources such as drugs, timber, diamonds, and other minerals. Often they then adopt terror to maintain control of the crucial resources rather than concentrating on the seizure of state power. Extensive connections with emigrant diasporas magnify those effects, most likely because the exiles both provide external support for rebels and offer conduits for contraband into and out of rebel territory (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) .
Terror and Specialists in Coercion
The prominence of organized armed forces in certain types of terror lends itself to analytic confusion. It is all too easy to conflate terror-deploying governments, armies, militias, paramilitaries, and rebels with conspiratorial zealots. We actually need a twofold distinction: first between violent specialists and others, then between actors who deploy terror within their own operating territories and those who direct it elsewhere. Figure 2 schematizes the two distinctions, assigning characteristic names to the four corners and midpoint of a two-dimensional space. Autonomists stand for all those politically active groups whose members sometimes launch terror attacks on authorities, symbolic objects, rivals, or stigmatized populations on their own territories without becoming durably organized specialists in coercion. Zealots maintain similar connections with each other, but commit their violent acts outside of their own base territories; they include long-term exiles who return home to attack their enemies. Governmental, nongovernmental, and antigovernmental militias maintain enduring organizations of coercive specialists and exercise terror within their base territories. Conspirators organize specialized striking forces for operations away from base. (Terrorinflicting armies that operate abroad also fit into this corner of the diagram, but they strike even more rarely than do mobile organizations of conspirators.) Finally, ordinary militants often spend time organizing and demonstrating, but now and then engage in armed attacks either near home or against the enemy far away.
As compared with the full range of collective violence, the use of terror ranks relatively high in the coordination among violent actors and the salience of short-run damage; in that regard it resembles what I call violent rituals and coordinated destruction while differing from broken negotiations, scattered attacks, opportunism, brawls, and individual aggression (Tilly, 2003: 15) . But the kinds of individuals and organizations that employ terror vary dramatically from one setting to another. The same individuals and organizations, furthermore, commonly alternate between terror and other forms of politics. The diagram as a whole states a major element of my argument: a remarkable array of actors sometimes adopt terror as a strategy, and therefore no single set of cause-effect propositions can explain terrorism as a whole.
The diagram incorporates a relational perspective in two senses. First, the processes that move people into one location or another within the locusspecialization space are fundamentally relational; they become militias, autonomists, zealots, conspirators, or ordinary militants -and sometimes switch among those forms of interaction -through shifting social relations. Second, despite their essentialist labels, the five types consist not of deeply different dispositions but of varying relations both a) among activists and b) between activists and targets of their terror.
You should therefore find a relational perspective especially helpful as you ponder a phenomenon that Stern rightly emphasizes: the formation of boundaries dividing the world into us and them, with little or no middle ground. Every social boundary creates a distinction between some us and some them. But it also organizes relations on each side of the boundary and across the boundary, as well as generating stories about boundary and relations (Tilly, 2004c) . The pure-impure distinctions of religious militants call up extreme versions of widely available religious boundaries between believers and others (Moore, 2000) . More important, boundary making and remaking occur constantly across social life, and organize a wide range of politics, including religious extremism.
Indeed, Stern implicitly concedes these points. Despite starting boldly with a strong set of dispositional statements about religious terrorists, she rapidly adds qualifications. Her terrorists have not just one but many grievances. Those grievances vary from spiritual to temporal, from instrumental to expressive, and from ideological to profit driven. Most pursue mixtures of religious and political goals. Their audiences range from enemies to followers. They vary significantly in group size, organizational sophistication, and capacity to inflict large-scale damage. Some are full-time terrorists, some are part-time amateurs, and some devote most of their effort to fighting in and with organized military units (Stern, 2003: 6-8) .
Stern recounts her conversation with Maqbool Pandit, who had held a high position in the Kashmiri Muslim group called Hiz-ul Mujahideen before he withdrew from activism. After answering a number of questions about the group's operations, Pandit asked Stern about her own views on the causes of militancy. 'This fight,' she reluctantly replied, is about real estate, national identity, political power, and profits -both personal and organizational. The fight is kept alive because organizations depend on it and because, on both sides, people are making a living. Smuggling goods. Selling arms. Lending money. Running camps. Running 'charities.' Training vulnerable young men to believe that the way to feel important and useful is by killing and getting killed in a purported holy war. The jihadi leaders live in mansions, while their operatives risk their lives. Agencies on both sides profit -professionally and financially. Why would they want this 'jihad' to end? I ask. (Stern, 2003: 235) Stern went on to say that humiliation, relative deprivation, and fear brought street-level militants into terrorism, but that the operation as a whole depended on support from rich sympathizers, sometimes including foreign governments. Pandit stayed silent for a long while, but finally agreed with her analysis (Stern, 2003: 236) . Pandit and Stern were agreeing on a whole series of relational explanations for organized terror.
When Stern starts to enumerate risk factors for the 'virus', she marches even deeper into relational territory. The world communications revolution, she tells us, is lowering recruitment, communication, and support costs. International flows of weapons likewise facilitate terrorism. Bad neighborhoods, failed states, refugee camps, criminal enterprises, and expatriates who contribute income, information, weapons, or connections to the cause all favor recruitment and support of terrorists. The failure of governments to provide basic services, protect human rights, or maintain monopolies of violence increases the prevalence of terror. High proportions of young, single males in a population make more potential terrorists available. Poverty may also promote terror, especially when educated young men remain unemployed.
Religiously based educational and welfare institutions, Stern continues, often serve as terrorist recruiting grounds. And humiliation itself -whether individual or categorical -results from well-defined social processes. The Muslim world currently produces more than its share of terrorists not because Islam condones terror, but because almost all of these favorable processes currently occur more widely in Muslim countries (Stern, 2003: 283-8) . Dismissing the ideology thesis, Stern makes some concessions to coercion and brainwashing, but offers a large opening to what I earlier called the variety thesis: a common strategy, multiple motives, complex social processes.
She'd better! When it comes to terror, the beginning of wisdom is to recognize it as a strategy. We might generalize that strategy by identifying its main components. It is one-sided, often pitting either relatively powerless people against very powerful enemies, or vice versa: powerful people, especially armies or governments, against the powerless. It deploys violence and threats of violence in the narrow sense of immediate damage to persons or objects rather than, say, shame or eternal damnation. It breaks with the political routines that prevail where it occurs. (That last qualification excludes capital punishment and other legally imposed penalties, perhaps improperly, from terror.)
We can say more. Many different actors, mostly political, sometimes engage in one-sided deployment of violence and threats of violence falling outside local political routines. They include autonomists such as Basque nationalists, militias of the kind that hacked off civilians' limbs in Sierra Leone, fullfledged armies like those on both sides that have massacred villagers in Sri Lanka, conspirators resembling 19th-century anarchist assassins, part-time militants on the model of antiabortion doctor killers who also demonstrate outside abortion clinics, and rare zealots in the style of Kerry Noble and his comrades in Arkansas' militant Christian cult, The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord.
Am I saying that Congress was wrong to require annual reports on worldwide terror from the State Department, because it was chasing a chimera? On the contrary, I am saying that to reduce the prevalence of terror in our conflict-ridden world, we must get it right. Although I don't trust State's numbers and dislike any definition of terror that excludes actions by armies and governments, I think that the collection of systematic evidence on actual events starts us in the right direction. To go far in that direction, however, we will have to move from dispositional to relational explanations. We will have to identify the relational processes that form and transform both drastic us-them boundaries and organized violence across those boundaries.
Stern herself remains surprisingly ambivalent. As she turns to recommendations for US policy, Stern veers back to her original grievance-based account. Speaking of reducing the risk factors for recruitment to terrorist causes, she concludes: ' We have yet to create a technology for fixing the "God-shaped hole" in human consciousness that is a symptom of modernity, or for curing alienation, humiliation, envy, or rage' (Stern, 2003: 289) . She then enumerates concrete measures that would not fill the hole in consciousness but would infiltrate, block, and counteract the organizations currently profiting from the availability of alienated youths. Of course, I deny that choking off the supply of alienated youths would suffice to end terrorism. Nevertheless, Stern and I agree, finally, that wherever and however it occurs, terror hurts innocent human beings. Explaining it therefore matters for world well-being. Good explanations put us on the path to effective action and counteraction.
